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A Lacuna in International Criminal Law?
In the course of human history, humankind has proven to be capable of performing the most 
horrendous acts towards itself. A locution ascribed to some of the worst of such atrocities is 
genocide. After the Holocaust, the international community started treating genocide as a 
substantive crime under international criminal law (ICL) rather than a regrettable consequence 
of state sovereignty. The crime of genocide is commonly regarded to be positioned at the apex of 
international criminality; it has been heralded in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunals as the “crime of crimes.”1 As such, the crime of genocide currently prevails as a legal 
label with strong power to condemn and communicate value-based considerations of atrocity, 
displaying the intrinsic connection between law and politics in ICL.2 
The crime is defined in Article II of the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention).3 It specifies certain acts intended to destroy, in 
part or in whole, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such, are condemned as genocide. 
The personal scope of application, however, has not always been limited to the enumerated 
collectives; that was a demarcation made during the Genocide Convention’s drafting process. 
Thereby, “genocidal” acts, committed with “genocidal” intent, when directed against other 
groups, such as groups defined by gender, are not considered to be genocide, at least departing 
from a “formalist,” as opposed to an “instrumentalist,” interpretation of Article II. This creates a 
discrepancy, perhaps even a lacuna, within the ICL system. 
To exemplify the discrepancy, consider the following. A community is suffering from over-
population. To gain control over its population size, it decides all families may have only one child 
for a period of time. The imagined community follows a dogmatic interpretation of primogeniture, 
meaning the child must be male. Consequently, all society-defined female children born during 
this period must be eliminated. While these circumstances may appear far-fetched, they are at the 
same time not too far removed from various sex-selection practices of some communities in the 
world today. The same conduct and intent directed against members of any of the enumerated 
groups in Article II would, with all likelihood, constitute genocide under international law. In turn, 
the victims would be labeled victims of genocide. Today, the same cannot be said for the girls in 
our narrative. Thereby, ICL distinguishes between the collectives and the deaths of their members 
through legal terminology of inclusion and exclusion. Does this current state of affairs emerge as 
problematic? Inspired by transnational feminist jurisprudence, this article delves deeper into this 
inquiry in the way it relates to groups defined by gender. Hannah Arendt explores a similar notion. 
The following statement can thereby serve as an illustrative point of departure.
If genocide is an actual possibility of the future, then no people on earth [...] can feel 
reasonably sure of its continued existence without the help and the protection of 
international law.4
To be clear, the purpose of this article is to investigate whether including groups defined by 
gender, as a protected group in the Genocide Convention, appears legally plausible.5 There is 
little sign today that the violent aspects of humankind are less forceful than they were when the 
Genocide Convention was first drafted in 1948. As such, the need to contemplate the current state 
of affairs concerning the groups the Convention protects is dire. Thereby, the purpose is, thus, not 
1 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 4, 1998, ICTR-97-23-S, para. 16.
2 For more on this theme, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
3 United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 260, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
December 9, 1948 (UN Doc. A/RES/260(III)).
5 Martti Koskenniemi, “What is Critical Research in International Law? Celebrating Structuralism,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 29, no. 3 (2016), 732.
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to argue for the extension of the protected groups to encompass the crime of genocide committed 
in a gender-related manner, but rather to probe the possibilities and problems with including such 
groups as a protected group pursuant to the Genocide Convention. From the outset, it should 
be borne in mind there is no common cross-cultural definition of gender. As such, gender’s 
complex construction as an analytical category is often used with little contemplation and harbors 
some inherent difficulties. Seeking to remedy this issue, there is reason to further elaborate how 
gender is understood. This paper begins the longer discussion with a focus on “genocidal” acts 
against women, with an understanding that future research needs to be done on the implications 
of other groups defined by gender to the arguments made in the article. Notwithstanding, the 
conceptualization of gender in this article draws from Iris Marion Young’s notion of “gender as 
seriality.” Seriality is made up of individuals’ ways of acting or being exposed to others’ actions. 
The actions, thereby, are directed towards the same object and depend on material surroundings 
being caused by various structures. In turn, the structures are a consequence of collective actions 
and practices. Belonging to a series is not a deliberate choice, even if the separate actions in a series 
take place deliberately. A series is “a social collective whose members are unified passively by the 
objects around which their actions are oriented or by the objectified results of the material effects of 
the actions of the others.”6 The view of gender as a “seriality” recognizes the uniqueness of persons 
in groups defined by gender, such as women, their interests, and the reality of gender hierarchies 
that surpass the confines of ethnic, cultural, and economic groups. To be specific, Young actualizes 
the concept of seriality to explain why women should not be presumed to constitute a singular 
group with common purposes. Yet, this point of departure threatens to lead to political lethargy. If 
women, or other groups defined by gender, do not share any interests, how can we conceptualize 
the disadvantages such persons suffer structurally? Young’s response is to view women as a “self-
alienated series,” arguing “their womanliness will not be the only thing that brings them together, 
since there are other concrete details of their lives that give them affinity, such as their class or 
race position.”7 Hence, it is the concept of seriality that allows us to see women, and other groups 
defined by gender, as a collective “without identifying common attributes that all women have or 
implying that all women have a common identity.”8  Consequently, the concept of seriality allows 
us to see gender might well emerge as a parameter to delineate a group targeted for destruction 
“as such.”
The Historical Origins of the Protected Groups in the Genocide Convention
During World War II, Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.9 
Etymologically, the neologism was a hybrid combining the Greek genos (race, tribe, or nation) and 
the Latin cide (killing). Prima facie, a verbatim interpretation appears to restrict the ambit of the 
concept to circumstances involving races, tribes, or nations. Indeed, in Axis Rule, Lemkin speaks of 
genocide as directed against national minorities.10 His conceptualization of genocide was, however, 
broader. He emphasized that “[i]f the destruction of human groups is a problem of international 
concern, then such acts should be treated as crimes under the law of nations.”11 In this regard, the 
concept of genocide was most likely conceived in a similar vein as a proposal Lemkin made in 
1933. At that time, he proposed the crime of barbarity, covering acts of extermination perpetrated 
“out of hatred towards a racial, religious or social collectivity.”12 Following this logic, it is plausible 
Lemkin did not anticipate the concept of genocide to be limited to a select number of groups. 
Rather, the object and purpose from his point of view was likely to construct a locution for “actions 
6 Iris Marion Young, “Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective,” Signs 19, no. 3 (1994), 724.
7 Ibid., 737.
8 Ibid., 714.
9 Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington: Carnegie, 1944).
10 Ibid.
11 Raphaël Lemkin, “Genocide as a Crime under International Law,” American Journal of International Law 41, no. 1 (1947), 
146.
12 Ibid. 
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subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently a human group.”13 Such a 
perspective opens up for the inclusion of various human groups, such as groups defined by gender.
The concept of genocide was rapidly incorporated into legal vocabulary after World War II. 
To counteract impunity for Nazi crimes, the Allied forces held an International Military Tribunal 
(IMT) in Nuremberg. Pursuant to Articles 6(a)-(c) of the London Charter, the IMT was granted 
jurisdiction over three separate crimes; crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. Consequently, since it was not a part of the IMT Charter, the locution “genocide” did 
not appear in the judgments. It was, however, used in the indictments as well as the prosecutors’ 
closing arguments as an explanatory term. Even though none of the defendants were convicted of 
genocide in the Nuremberg trials, the judgments did explain acts which today would be defined as 
genocide. Thus, the early use of the concept of genocide set “the stage for the evolution of genocide 
into a separate criminal offence.”14
After the Nuremberg trials, a US military tribunal which operated pursuant to Control Council 
No. 10 (CC10) tried Nazi officials.15 In their jurisprudence, genocide started to materialize as a term 
with legal substance. Genocide, the Tribunal argued, was “the prime illustration of a crime against 
humanity.”16 Consequently, the Tribunal constructed genocide as a subcategory of the broader 
notion of crimes against humanity. The genocide convictions pursuant to CC10 therefore highlight 
the transformation of the locution “genocide” from an explanatory concept, to a part of legal 
terminology in the IMT proceedings, and then to a subset of crimes against humanity.
The end of World War II signaled the onset of the desire to prevent horrendous acts like the 
Holocaust from happening again, which in turn provided the momentum for international society 
to make considerable efforts towards unification. This post-war momentum led to the establishment 
of the UN. The adoption of an international legal instrument devoted to genocide ensued.17 The UN 
General Assembly (UNGA) was the first organ to actualize the matter within the new international 
order, and on December 11, 1946, it unanimously passed Resolution 96(1). The Resolution defined 
the crime of genocide as “the denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide 
is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”18 Notably, the Resolution ascertains 
that “genocide is a crime under international law […] whether the crime is committed on religious, 
racial, political or any other grounds.”19 Matthew Lippman labels this a liberal conceptualization,20 
with the philosophical underpinning that the use of violence to exterminate groups of human 
beings, on the sole basis of their affinity to a particular group, is despicable. Such a construction 
opens for a broad conception of genocide. As a matter of history, the core of the resolution could 
be extended to encompass gender collectives, apart from the currently enumerated ones. Since 
the Resolution, coupled with the explicit reference in the Genocide Convention’s preamble, was 
adopted unanimously and without debate, it is important as a matter of opinio juris.21 It has even 
been argued, through the phrasing in Resolution 96(1), other groups can be considered protected 
by a jus cogens norm, which prohibits genocide.22
Resolution 96(1) requested the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to prepare a draft 
convention on the crime of genocide, which in turn, instructed the Secretary-General to perform 
13 Ibid., 147.
14 David Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8.
15 Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 
10 (Buffalo: WS Hein, 1949), 277–335.
16 Ibid., 983.
17 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 29.
18 United Nations. General Assembly Resolution 96(1). The Crime of Genocide. December 11, 1946 (UN Doc A/BUR/50).
19 Ibid. Emphasis added.
20 Matthew Lippman, “The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Fifty Years Later,” 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 8 (1998), 448.
21 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 56.
22 Beth Van Schaack, “The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Convention’s Blind Spot,” Yale Law Journal 106, no. 7 
(1997), 2259–2263.
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the same task.23 The Secretariat’s Draft was written by the Secretariat’s Human Rights Division, 
assisted by, inter alia, Lemkin himself. The Secretary-General set about drafting a treaty that would, 
as far as possible, “embrace all points likely to be adopted, leaving it to the competent organs 
of the United Nations to eliminate what they did not wish to include.”24 The draft convention 
discarded the residual reference to “any other groups.”25 However, the Secretary-General noted 
that the list of protected groups was to be considered “not exhaustive.”26 The Secretariat’s Draft 
thereby gives sufficient leeway in imagining collectives defined on the basis of gender as coherent 
with the other groupings. Nevertheless, the Secretary-General anticipated which groups to 
protect would be “the first general question which will have to be settled,”27 thereby identifying 
the crux of which groups to include as a political dilemma. To deal with these issues, an ad hoc 
Committee was created.28 Notably, the Committee considered it essentially within the competence 
of governments to answer the question of “[w]hat human groups should be protected? Should all 
human groups [...] be protected or only some of them?”29 Eventually, the ad hoc Committee settled 
for the same category of protected groups as in the Secretariat’s draft. The question of whether the 
enumerated groups were to be considered exhaustive was, however, a matter left undiscussed. 
The UN’s Sixth Committee drafted the final text of the Genocide Convention, who likely felt it 
was important to complete the Convention swiftly, “before the memory of the barbarous crimes 
which had been committed faded from the minds of men.”30 Against this background, the Iranian 
delegate suggested “adopting a convention embodying all the points on which agreement was 
possible,” leaving the more cumbersome problems for an “additional convention [to] settle.”31 The 
draft convention by the Sixth Committee subsequently was unanimously adopted on December 9, 
1948 by the UNGA and the same construction applies today.32
The deliberations over which groups ought to be protected should be understood in its 
broader context. At its inception, it was imagined the spirit of the concept of genocide, illustrated 
by Lemkin’s own writings and Resolution 96(1), would be applied on a wider scale. During the 
drafting process, the concept became restricted due to political compromise. Consequently, as 
constructed today, the scope of protection from genocide under ICL is limited to four “protected 
groups,” instead of “actions subordinated to the criminal intent to destroy or cripple permanently 
a human group.”33 There is, thus, an evident disparity between genocide, as Lemkin imagined it, 
and the Genocide Convention, the latter being considerably more restrictive. It has been questioned 
whether the drafters were aware of making decisions of legislative character, rather than political 
ditto.34 In this regard, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn note “the wording of the Convention is 
so restrictive that not one of the genocidal killings committed since its adoption is covered by 
it.”35 Consequently, “the Convention’s list of protected groups has probably provoked more debate 
since 1948 than any other aspect of the instrument.”36
The Protected Groups
The Genocide Convention does not protect all human groups. As per the definition, the crime of 
genocide can only be committed against members of national, ethnic, racial, or religious collectives. 
23 United Nations. Economic and Social Council Resolution 47(IV). Crime of Genocide. March 28, 1947 (UN Doc E/325).
24 United Nations, Secretariat Draft. First Draft of the Genocide Convention, June 17, 1947 (UN Doc. E/447).
25 United Nations, Economic and Social Council Resolution 77(V). Genocide, August 6, 1947.
26 United Nations, Secretariat Draft. First Draft of the Genocide Convention, June 17, 1947 (UN Doc. E/447).
27 Ibid.
28 United Nations, Economic and Social Council Resolution 117(VI), Genocide, March 3, 1948 (UN Doc. E/734).
29 United Nations, Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Summary Records (April 5–May 10, 1948). UN Doc. E/AC25/SR.13.
30 United Nations, Proposal of the Delegation of the United States of America, October 1, 1948 (UN Doc A/C6/208).
31 United Nations, Sixty-Sixth Meeting. October 4, 1947 (UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.66).
32 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 83.
33 Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime, 147.
34 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 108.
35 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 11.
36 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 117.
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Thus, interpreting the crime as a departure from a “formalist” interpretation of the provision, 
genocide cannot be committed towards groups defined by gender. The victims, moreover, must 
be chosen based on their membership to such a collective with the intent to destroy the group “in 
whole or in part.” They are in this respect a means to an end.
Given the four enumerated groups are the sole beneficiaries of the protection granted by the 
Genocide Convention, it could be argued it is regrettable that there is no recognized definition for 
any of them in the Convention or elsewhere. However, it is near impossible to attribute a distinct 
meaning to them, as they intersect and overlap significantly. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) Trial Chamber in Akayesu, however, set out to construct objective definitions 
for each of the four groups enumerated in Article II.37 To determine whether a group fell within 
the ambit of the Convention, the ICTR required an “objective evaluation” of the group to see if it fit 
the scheme of the definitions they posed. The “objective approach” to the protected groups offered 
by the ICTR in Akayesu was gradually moved away from the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunals. Later judgments employ a leaning towards subjective parameters.38 The 
“subjective approach” refers to the perpetrator’s point of view of the victim group.39 If the 
génocidaire defines the victim group as one of the protected groups of genocide, the victim group is 
such a group. The perpetrator’s perspective, thereby, becomes the defining element for the crime 
of genocide. It is, however, hard to reconcile this rationale with principles of legality. Foreseeability 
and specificity of criminal conduct are paramount parameters of the principle of legality, and it is 
difficult to imagine the subjective approach in fulfilling such requirements. Every génocidaire will 
differ in mind-set and will have a different perspective of their victims. As such, there will be a 
lack of a uniform measurement of victim groups. Employing a subjective approach is, however, 
coherent with the sociological processes leading up to genocide. Inherent in every act of genocide 
is the génocidaire’s prejudice against “the Other” group. The génocidaire identifies, distinguishes 
between, and stigmatizes the Other.40 Subsequently, they seek to exterminate it. Within the context 
of sociology, the stigmatization of other groups is commonly referred to as “othering.”41 To some 
extent, through leaning on subjective parameters, this process is transplanted into the context of 
genocide law. The criticism directed against the subjective approach above, however, appears quite 
serious. There is reason to be wary of such drawbacks. At the same time, given such stigmatization 
cannot arise from a structural vacuum, the characteristics of the group can be identified in the 
penumbra of its sociohistorical context via the subjective perspective. 
Protecting Human Groups in International Criminal Law
Dealing with groups in a legal context is arguably more complex than what prima facie may be 
expected, especially since groups exist without inherent meaning. All content is socially assigned 
through interpretation and argumentation. In legal discourse, this operation is achieved in the 
context of “applicable law.” Through legal vocabulary, the theoretical conception of a “group” is 
diminished to a formal description, stipulating requirements for determining inclusion or exclusion. 
The description then becomes a vessel for rights and obligations. In turn, such requirements must be 
applied to the “everyday reality.” Thereby, legal actors, such as judges and prosecutors, take active 
part in mobilizing specific discursive resources in establishing and creating a sense of legitimacy 
for the requirements that define the groups.42
Forcing human groups into legal conceptions requires cursory understandings of the groups 
in question. This is sometimes achieved by having group definitions revolve around quantifiable, 
“objective” markers, as if the groups were material objects. Indeed, that is what the ICTR sought to 
do in Akayesu. Such mechanisms prevail in the historical precedents of genocide. For instance, in 
the Nazi practices of extermination during the Holocaust, the Nazis had problems “parsing out a 
coherent legal definition for the Jewish community or even in identifying its members.”43 The same 
difficulties in dealing with “types” of human groups actualize in a legal setting. Nevertheless, the 
41 Antoine Holslag, “The Process of Othering from the ‘Social Imaginaire’ to Physical Acts: An Anthropological 
Approach,” Genocide Studies and Prevention 9, no. 1 (2015), 96.
42 Teun van Dijk, Ideology: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: SAGE Publications, 1998), 225–262.
43 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 51.
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Convention opts for protecting four, clearly delimited, but narrowly construed human groups. 
The restrictive personal scope of the Convention has sparked critique from scholars as well as 
practitioners.44 The criticism often emanates from creative interpretations of the treaty text or 
finding something new from the travaux préparatoires to solve the faulty Article II. The assertions 
seemingly aim to reach a predetermined conclusion of including a certain human group. Such an 
altruistic goal may be commendable. The jurisprudence, however, is not.
In the ICTR, questions dealing with the problem of whether the Tutsi could be considered a 
protected group pursuant to Article II of the Convention emerged. The Trial Chamber in Akayesu 
noted it was unquestionably “the Tutsi ethnic group which was targeted” by the Hutu majority 
government solely because of their affinity to the Tutsi group.45 The categorization of the Tutsi as 
an ethnic group emanated from their history of being different from the Hutu created by previous 
colonial authorities as well as between the Rwandans themselves. This was not sufficient to fit the 
Tutsi within the scheme of an ethnic group in the sense of the Convention since, turning to the 
defining characteristics of ethnic groups, it becomes evident the Tutsi and the Hutu who massacred 
them share many traits. Disregarding the racial, or racist, considerations of the colonial authorities, 
they share the same language, religion, and essentially the same culture. This prompted the tribunal 
to scrutinize the theoretical underpinnings for protecting groups “as such.” The tribunal initially 
sought to establish “objective” definitions of each of the four groups enumerated in the Genocide 
Convention. Subsequently, the tribunal turned to the travaux préparatoires and determined the 
common denominator for the enumerated groups was membership, was normally unchallengeable 
by members, “who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable 
manner.”46 By continued reference to the travaux préparatoires, the tribunal took the position that it 
was “particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention.”47 
This led the Trial Chamber to the conclusion that the drafters’ intention was “patently to ensure 
the protection of any stable and permanent group.”48 Accordingly, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu 
deviated from a formalist reading of Article II and constructed the physical or biological destruction 
of a group “as such” as genocide, even if a victimized group fell outside the scope of the enumerated 
groups. That is, insofar the group is stable and permanent. Through an “instrumentalist” approach, 
the Tutsi was a protected group within the framework of the Convention.
There is reason to approach the jurisprudence in Akayesu with skepticism. The overarching 
goal with the judgment was likely to expand the groups encompassed by the Convention to fit 
into an “everyday reality” that had changed since the drafting of the Convention. However, the 
travaux préparatoires are scarcely so consistent that it is possible to discern just a single intent. Many 
states took part in the negotiations with many conflicting interests. Moreover, standpoints in treaty 
negotiations are hardly sources of binding international law. They may provide evidence for opinio 
juris, but as substantive legal sources, their use is limited. Additionally, recourse to preparatory 
works of international treaties may be had when the provision “leaves the meaning ambiguous” or 
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd.”49 In the case of the Genocide Convention, this becomes 
unlikely. Article II encompasses four groups. It would have surely followed from the treaty text 
if the manifest intent was to extend the protection of the Convention to all stable and permanent 
groups. If taken seriously, the “stability and permanence” criterion would mean the catalogization 
of groups in Article II is meaningless. Additionally, arguing for stability and permanence as the sole 
parameters worth protecting in groups is conceptually confusing. Dialectically, the tribunal argued 
that group members in a “redeemable manner” could not be “stable and permanent.” Many of the 
groups enumerated in the Convention do, however, allow redeemable group membership. It is 
possible to exit a religion. It is possible to terminate nationality. Ethnicity can be achieved through 
marriage and terminated through divorce.
44 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 117.
45 Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 124.
46 Ibid., para. 511.
47 Ibid., para. 516.
48 Ibid.
49 Articles 31 and 32(a)–(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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Akayesu is not alone in its attempt to align the formalist “legal reality” with changing discourses 
of “everyday reality.” Shortly after the creative, instrumentalist interpretation in Akayesu, the 
Spanish Court of Appeals followed suit and deviated from a verbatim reading of the treaty text in 
the indictment of Augusto Pinochet. The Court argued that the concept of a national group, as it 
follows from the Convention, also encompasses political and social groups, and genocide should 
be approached in “social terms, without any need for a criminal law definition.”50 From a different 
perspective, scholars have suggested introducing new victim categories under customary law.51
The narrow conceptualization of the protected groups under Article II of the Genocide 
Convention has thus sparked several arguments for introducing new victim categories within 
the framework for the crime of genocide. While the arguments may not withstand scrutiny, they 
highlight that the Genocide Convention is having difficulties answering contemporary challenges 
concerning the groups it protects in situations where utilizing it appears appropriate. Perhaps, 
the solution will not lie in extravagant readings of the treaty text or unearthing something from 
the travaux préparatoires. A more appropriate approach would be to ascertain if there is a more 
systemically plausible path to achieving these goals. Such an operation first requires disentangling 
the theoretical underpinnings for including certain groups while excluding others. The idea of 
expanding the list of protected groups is, however, not novel. It has been proposed that including 
new groups places a loose lid on the Pandora’s box of protecting human groups, and there is 
no “logical stopping point” if new groups were added.52 William Schabas assumes this formalist 
position, as opposed to an instrumental ditto, noting that the dilemma with introducing new 
groups is “the difficulty in providing a rational basis for such a measure,” arguing “if one group 
is to be included, why not the disabled, or other groups based on arbitrary criteria?”53 One may as 
well ask the question, “indeed, why not”?
Some parties to the Convention have opted for a wider conceptualization of the protected 
groups as a matter of domestic law and include any groups defined on any arbitrary criterion.54 
The overarching rationale can be explained by the fact that any arbitrary group could, theoretically, 
be subject to genocidal extermination; notwithstanding which group this may be, such conduct is 
abhorrent and the group must be protected. The standpoint does have merit but does not withstand 
closer examination. Genocide is a sui generis crime, it is entirely unique, seeking to protect the human 
diversity of groups. To preserve the crime’s standing at the “apex of international criminality,” it 
cannot have a too wide scope of application. Such an order could effectively render the concept 
of genocide void of content, a logic that relates to the “expressivist function” of genocide.55 Legal 
constructions ought to reflect the broader social and political discourses in which they exist. 
Thus, there is commendable wisdom in not encompassing all “arbitrary” groups pursuant to the 
Genocide Convention. It is likely the drafters arrived at the same conclusion, seeing as they opted 
to enumerate four different groups officially protected from genocide.
The common denominator for the protected groups is that they all reflect different, but 
important facets of individual identity. Associating with the protected groups can be assumed 
paramount to the extent the members of the groups should not be forced by means of physical 
or biological genocide to relinquish affinity to their collective. This analysis is supported by the 
perception of “human groups” as social constructs rather than scientific, quantifiable items. Indeed, 
bearing in mind the “subjective approach,” the scientific accuracy is irrelevant in ascertaining the 
crime of genocide. It is the perspective of the génocidaire that determines group membership. There 
is no need for the génocidaire to be rational in their targeting for destruction. The sole parameter to 
50 Reed Brody and Michael Ratner, The Pinochet Papers – The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (London: Kluwer, 
2000), 100.
51 Van Schaack, Blind Spot, 2259.
52 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 59.
53 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 132.
54 Code Penal Article 211–1 (France), Penal Code. C 2 Article 313 [Genocide] (Burkina Faso), Law No 8–98 (31 Oct 1998) C 1 
Article 1 [Genocide] (Congo).
55 Dianne Marie Amann, “Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide,” International Criminal Law Review 2, no. 2 (2002), 
93.
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ascertain is whether the perpetrator had a discriminatory intent to exterminate, in part or in whole, 
a group based on national, ethnical, racial or religious affinity. It matters not that the group can 
be objectively defined as one of the four groups, or even that the group de facto existed. The legal 
construction of genocide uses groups as an analytical framework and the group that matters is 
purely conceptual.
The rationale behind the protected groups can be described as the protection of individuals’ 
right to take part and form a kind of shared and collective existence, be it deliberate or not. Within 
a legal framework of “applicable law,” this operation becomes simplified, since it is easier to speak 
in terms of acts directed at “protected groups” in a court of law rather than acknowledging the 
groups we speak of do not exist, but only as impromptu constructions. As such, they become 
symbols for transgressions of intrinsic values of human life. The legal construction of the “protected 
groups” can therefore be perceived as a proxy for the rights of individuals to engage, or be coded, 
in different types of collectivity with freedom from being subject to genocidal acts. Hence, the 
“crime of genocide” is best understood as an instrument which ascertains these imperative rights 
of individuals through taking care of a particular group. The systemic order can be compared to 
the international human rights regime, where individual rights are of principal importance. The 
human rights system, on the other hand, rests on the premise that group rights are ascertained 
through individuals.56 Given the Convention’s protected groups build on the effective exercise 
of human rights that can only be coherent in communion on a collective scale, it is plausible the 
Genocide Convention follows a similar logic.
With this foregoing as a backdrop, we now employ the interpretative canon of ejusdem 
generis, meaning “of the same kind,” to analyze if the conceptual parameters of inclusion can be 
extended in a similar manner to groups defined by gender, or if they are unique to the groups 
enumerated. The underlying premise is if such groups are of a similar kind, then including them 
within the Convention’s legal protection under the same framework may appear plausible. Groups 
defined by gender are highly volatile and temporal.57 Although used in reference to exclude 
political groups, stability and permanence cannot adequately justify the inclusion of groups in 
the Genocide Convention. Not all the enumerated groups are stable and permanent. Indeed, the 
conceptualization of groups defined by gender intersects largely with how ethnical and racial 
groups are constructed. The concept of ethnicity connected to a common language or culture, 
whereas the concept of race to a criterion of “hereditary physical traits.”58 Groups defined by 
gender can be perceived as an amalgamation of these conceptualizations, a socially constructed 
label, influenced by social and cultural preconditions. This similarity is mirrored in other aspects of 
ICL.59 Similarly, to the enumerated groups, belonging to a group defined by gender can be assumed 
as an intrinsic value of social existence, an important facet of individuality. Such a resemblance is 
reflected within the scheme of international human rights law. Since genocide has been perceived 
as the “ultimate crime and the gravest violation of human rights it is possible to commit,”60 such 
a comparison is relevant. The enumerated groups can all be characterized by the rights granted 
through membership; that is, the right to existence is the property of a group member, be it on 
the basis of nationality, ethnicity, race or religion. The rights of groups defined by gender follow a 
similar rationale; all the major international human rights treaties prohibit discrimination based on 
gender and/or sex, beyond the four enumerated groups. Genocide and gender-specific genocide 
focus on the physical or biological destruction of a particular group. As such, they will always deal 
with the most severe infringements of fundamental human rights. It is crucial not to exaggerate this 
56 See Ian Brownlie, “The Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law,” Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal 
Philosophy 9, no. 2 (1985), 105.
57 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990), 7.
58 See for instance, Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 513, 514. 
59 Article 7(1)(h) of the United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998 and corrected by 
process-verbaux of November 10, 1998, July 12, 1999, November 30, 1999, May 8, 2000, January 17, 2001 and January 
16, 2002 (UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9).
60 United Nations, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The 
Whitaker Report), July 2, 1985 (UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6), 5.
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aspect, however. It is not the transgression of these rights per se that merits the label “genocide.” 
Apart from the individual rights, genocide violates the group’s right to existence. Nonetheless, the 
protected groups depart from a perspective where paramount collective rights are transgressed 
through serious personal violence, which may necessitate treating the encroachment as genocide.61 
It is on the aforementioned substantive fundamental rights in which the protected groups build 
on, and the rights apply equally to groups defined by gender. Hence, the continued exclusion 
of gender from the Genocide Convention appears disparate with the international human rights 
structure. If other groups similar to such groups have a right to existence, together with a right not 
to be refused that existence, groups defined by gender must do too.
Often, complexities emerge in determining whether the targeting of a group builds on the 
traits of any of the enumerated groups, gender traits, or if it is a hybrid. Yet, the subjective approach 
merely requires the genocidal acts be essentially based on any of the enumerated traits. To that 
end, a gendered aspect of genocide is simply sorted away as legally irrelevant. Under these 
circumstances, a perpetrator can claim a genocidal act was committed on gender-specific basis as a 
viable defense for the crime of genocide. Thereby, the current construction of the protected groups 
favors gender discrimination over, for instance, religious discrimination. In a similar manner, 
surely, the current structure of the convention may, for example, take on gendered dimensions by 
preventing births or rape within an overarching group. Such arguments appear when we turn to 
historical genocides. For instance, the notion that the Tutsi or Bosnian Muslim groups were partly 
destroyed through rape because the rape victims (who were women) would be excluded from the 
collective appears to crystallize traits which undoubtedly oppress women inside the group. The 
assumption is the dissolution of the target group is, in part, the result of an internal process where 
group members take part in their own destruction. This is achieved through the belief of a gender 
vis-à-vis gender antagonism that augments the scheme of the génocidaires. To hold such traits as 
natural truths of ethnicity render them invisible and makes them harder to contest, as a consequence 
of being incorporated into the narrative of victimization. The incorporation may oversimplify, and 
even caricature, ethnicity and gender alike, through constructing Bosnian Muslim and Tutsi men 
as inherently prone to excluding rape victims.
Drawing from this analysis, it could be argued that the current scheme of the convention 
is disparate with the commitment “to promote social progress” as a cardinal value and specific 
purpose for the UN as an institution, especially since it is through legal instruments this value 
is to be realized.62 If the UN’s underlying engagement to “international social justice,” argued to 
form the “essence of public international law in the second half of the 20th century,”63 is to be 
taken seriously, there is an urgent need to consider how groups defined by gender fit within this 
structure. The analysis shows gender collectives are of a similar kind to the existing protected 
groups. Consequently, it would not be out of place to extend similar treatment to groups defined 
by gender in the context of genocide.
Groups defined by gender have been subject to genocidal acts like few other collectives. There 
is a plethora of historical examples of gender-specific genocides. Witch-hunts in Early Modern 
Europe, widow burning (sati), female feticide, dowry deaths, the Massacre of Bangladesh men 
in 1971, and maternal mortality are all examples of where gender-specific elements have been 
highly prevalent in situations of mass killings.64 Gender-specific genocides are thus a historical 
reality and seem to cry out for the application of the Genocide Convention. Such an assertion 
does not mean other, non-enumerated groups are subordinate to such groups. Other collectives 
may fit the theoretical underpinnings of protecting certain human groups from genocide as well. 
Surely, the political realities of reopening the convention would be difficult. Although, the fact that 
other human groups may be equally appropriate candidates should not hamper the overarching 
discussion as it relates to groups defined by gender, which is the focal point here. Ascertaining 
61 Nersessian, Genocide and Political Groups, 80.
62 The UN Charter preamble, para. 3.
63 Rudolf Bernhardt, Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (New York: North Holland, 1993), 252–262.
64 Gendercide Watch, “History of ‘Gendercide’,” accessed May 3, 2019, http://www.gendercide.org/what_is_
gendercide.html.
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eligibility for other groups is a different question and is not relevant for the issue of gender in 
relation to genocide.
Crimes against Humanity – an Adequate Proxy?
The following section asks whether gender-specific genocides have been appropriately responded 
to under existing substantive crimes under international law. In this regard, Schabas argues that 
atrocities committed “against groups not covered by Article II of the Genocide Convention are 
adequately addressed by other legal norms, in particular [...] crimes against humanity.”65
Genocide and crimes against humanity can be perceived as sister crimes. Both infractions were 
construed against the historical backdrop of the Nazi acts of extermination during the Holocaust. 
The two crimes currently have diverging raisons d’être and protect different values. A widespread 
or systematic attack on a gender group, because the members belong to that group, amounts to 
crimes against humanity. That is very different from an attack on a gender group because the 
members belong to that group paired with the intent to destroy the gender group “as such.”66 
National, ethnical, racial, and, religious groups are all protected from crimes against humanity, as 
well as the crime of genocide. In case groups defined by gender are subject to genocidal acts, only 
crimes against humanity can be applied, since there is no parallel crime for genocide committed 
based on gender. Making references to crimes against humanity as a surrogate for a gender-
specific genocide risks an inadequate reflection on the content of the criminal categories. The 
socially constructed label of a crime, to which the criminal conduct is attached, ought to mirror 
the culpability and seriousness of the offence appropriately. Genocides will often satisfy the 
requirements for crimes against humanity. The same cannot be said for the reverse, because of the 
dolus specialis of genocide. Constructing a gender-specific genocide as a crime against humanity 
does not demarcate the perpetrator’s overarching and specialized intent to destroy a specific group 
“as such,” which really is far more culpable. A perpetrator of crimes against humanity aims to 
murder, whereas a génocidiare aims to destroy a certain group. The construction of genocide is 
thus more specific in terms of mens rea in comparison to crimes against humanity. The same can 
be said for the prohibited acts of genocide. Only five specific acts can be qualified as genocide. 
Crimes against humanity could surely encompass those acts but would not be limited to them. The 
specificity which the legal label of genocide offers is thus far more complete in describing gender-
specific genocidal conduct.
From a different perspective, labeling gender-specific genocide as crimes against humanity 
confuses the personal scope of the crimes. While crimes against humanity are prohibited as a type 
of persecution against the individual attacked, genocide is the opposite. Genocide is fundamentally 
an infraction directed towards groups, and the criminalization thereof ascertains protection for 
certain groups from physical and biological destruction. Crimes against humanity encompass 
violations of fundamental rights on an individual basis. In the case a “group” is covered by crimes 
against humanity, is purely ancillary to the individual. Therefore, crimes against humanity are 
unable to adequately describe attacks against groups.67
The way we label crimes has a deeper meaning than solely relating to parameters of 
culpability of the crime. It also expresses a form of hierarchy between the core international crimes, 
communicating the severity of one crime in relation to the others. Genocide stands at the “apex 
of international criminality.”68 It is imagined to be the most heinous crime possible. The moral 
condemnation implied with the locution “genocide” is far more serious than any other international 
crime. The hierarchy among the international core crimes is less acute for national, ethnical, 
racial, and religious groups. Both criminal constructions can be applied in a parallel manner. As 
a matter of criminal cumulation, a perpetrator can be sentenced for genocide as well as crimes 
against humanity. This renders courts capable of distinguishing between attacks directed towards 
65 Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 171. 
66 Chile Eboe-Osuji, ed., Protecting Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem Pillay (Leiden, 
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 168.
67 David Luban, “A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity,” Yale Journal of International Law 29, no. 1 (2004), 97.
68 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 4, 1998, ICTR-97-23-S, para. 16.
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individuals on a widespread and systematic scale, and conduct intended to exterminate groups of 
individuals. They can, therefore, pass judgments that more accurately describe the nature of the 
conduct, when directed towards any of the enumerated groups. Genocidal acts directed towards 
groups defined by gender, however, either are constructed as the inferior transgression crimes 
against humanity or fall outside the ambit of ICL completely. At their core, genocide and crimes 
against humanity are two separate offences dealing with different issues. The current scheme of 
the protected groups in the Genocide Convention communicates a value-based signal regarding 
which groups are worthier of protection from the worst kind of criminality. Dialectically, it 
expresses the worth of groups defined by gender in relation to the four enumerated collectives 
in Article II. Essentially, the Genocide Convention is a bearer of symbolic values. As such, the 
way we construct legal categorizations is of paramount importance. It is possible to describe 
the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust as episodes of “mass killings.” That categorization, 
however, would be unsuccessful in capturing the whole picture of the atrocities. The same applies 
to gender-specific genocides. There is wisdom in communicating a total recognition of criminal 
conduct. A similar rationale spurred international society to construct genocide in the first place. 
Given gender-specific genocides have existed historically, the omission to cover gender-specific 
genocides from genocide has factual ramifications. As a matter of de lege lata, there is no specific 
expression that groups defined by gender are warranted protection from physical and biological 
destruction “as such.”
The omission to protect from gender-specific genocides in the Genocide Convention entails 
a strange systemic application of ICL. Returning to the narrative in the introduction, through a 
formalist interpretation of Article II, the murdered daughters are, at best, currently labeled victims 
of crimes against humanity. If the imagined community instead adopted a policy of infanticide 
towards babies who bear certain “hereditary physical characteristics,” we label the babies killed 
victims of genocide, since they would be constructed as a part of a racial group.69 The labels convey 
for us, the international society, and the future, that the babies of the racial group symbolize 
something bigger, namely genocide directed towards the “racial group” itself. The murdered 
daughters, on the other hand, do not qualify for that symbolic treatment. The destruction of women 
more broadly is left unnoticed by ICL.
A Space for Gender in the Genocide Convention?
The continued omission of gender-specific genocides within the ambit of the Genocide Convention 
ought to, from today’s perspective, be characterized as a choice. Ultimately, the current construction, 
the “choice,” relates to the junction between formalism and instrumentalism. Instrumentalism and 
formalism signify two opposite sensibilities of what it means to be an international lawyer, and 
two cultures of professional practice in the ICL sphere; which relates to the question of whether 
legal philosophy should assimilate ethical standards or confine itself to an analysis of black letter 
law. Systemically, the Genocide Convention’s construction of the protected groups in Article II 
is “formalist” in the sense of proposing a certain a priori formal matrix of social space; it leans 
on a token ahistorical formal framework defining the legal terrain within which an open and 
endless game of contingent inclusions and exclusions occur.70 Yet, the notion of genocide is not 
predetermined; what it will mean, what this term will include, and what it will exclude (that 
is, to which extent women, gays, trans people, and so forth, are included or excluded within its 
structure) will always be the result of contingent hegemonic struggle.71 This highlights that the 
Genocide Convention, in reality, is an empty signifier which emerges as a battlefield for hegemonic 
interests, that does not seek to reach some fixed content as its ultimate point of arrival, but only 
has itself as an objective, demarcated by the empty signifier that is genocide. While the formalist 
jurisprudential culture in the Genocide Convention may not be adverse per se, it risks giving the 
appearance of the content in the instrument, that is, the Genocide Convention, as determinate and 
69 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber Judgment, September 2, 1998, ICTR-96-4-T, para. 514.
70 Judith Butler, Ernest Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, eds., Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the 
Left (London: Verso, 2000), 110.
71 Ibid., 90, 110.
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ahistorical when it is not so. Rather, an empty signifier with no determinate meaning signifies 
only the existence of meaning in itself, instead of absence thereof.72 Seen from this perspective, the 
crime of genocide is an institution that has no definite, determinate function, but only a negative 
one of expressing the actuality of the institution as such, instead of its non-existence. Following 
a Hegelian logic, such a rationale can be characterized as a direct embodiment of the ideological 
function of painting a “neutral” picture within which all social antagonism has been wiped out. 
The current construction of the protected groups therefore appears to express a position of which 
groups that are politically warranted protection “as such.” Thus, the interest of protecting groups 
defined by gender from physical and biological destruction is not considered politically motivated. 
This is, however, not a static position, but instead, politically changeable. After having analyzed 
this, potential ramifications emanating from the current construction of the crime of genocide can 
now be discussed. The underlying premise is that the issues emerge as problematic in the sense 
they provide support for the claim that the Convention is unnecessarily narrow concerning the 
groups it grants protection; in particular with groups defined by gender. Thereby, by virtue of their 
existence, the problems enable a hypothetical inclusion of groups defined by gender as protected 
to appear theoretically plausible. This approach does not carry the pretense that what is needed is 
to construct additional policies and rules. Rather, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding 
of what transpires beneath the façade of the implementation and application of Article II of the 
Genocide Convention.73
Simply expanding the Genocide Convention is problematic. Indeed, “[d]iluting the definition, 
either by formal amendment of its terms or by extravagant interpretation of the existing text, risks 
trivializing the horror of the real crime when it is committed.”74 This is a legitimate apprehension. 
Stuart Stein opines that the analysis of scholars probing “other-cides” “is often directed toward, 
or ends with, establishing that the mass killing cluster under consideration meets the definitional 
parameters of genocide, however defined.”75
As indicated above, the article does not seek merely to establish such genocidal credentials. 
The backdrop produced here attempts to highlight that the omission of protect groups defined 
by gender under the Genocide Convention is an unreasonable restriction. The definition of a 
gender-specific genocide elaborated herein deviates from the definition of the crime of genocide 
in only one aspect; in terms of the protected groups. The analysis is faithful to the core concept of 
genocide and advocates the application of genocide only in its prototypical meaning, to cover acts 
intended to destroy a human group “as such.” The article thereby joins the scholars, arguing that 
the failure to encompass groups other than the four enumerated has caused the Convention to 
become “conceptually confused.”76
It is a common argument that too wide a conceptualization of genocide may diminish the 
value-based signals the crime sends. However, the very same danger to the legitimacy may emerge 
if the construction is too narrow in its scope. If that is the case, the construction runs a risk of 
undermining, what Dianne Marie Amann calls, the expressivist function of criminalizing genocide, 
given that legal constructions reflect the broader social and political discourses in which they 
operate.77 As such, it is of paramount importance that the way genocide is judicially constructed 
corroborates with the social and political reality in which it exists. Should there be a discord, the 
crime risks losing legitimacy as it may be viewed as outdated and arbitrary. Thereby, the argument 
that the drafters of the Genocide Convention wanted to encompass “national minorities,” and the 
enumerated groups are different faces of that concept, must be disregarded. Even if the drafters 
wanted to protect national minorities, the intention of the drafters almost seventy years ago cannot 
justify the choices we make concerning the crime of genocide today. Referring to intellectual 
72 Ibid., 113-115.
73 Martti Koskenniemi, Critical Research in International Law, 730.
74 William Schabas, Genocide in International Law, 133. See also Amann, Expressivism, 95.
75 Stuart Stein, “Geno- and Other Cides: A Cautionary Note on Knowledge Accumulation,” Journal of Genocide Research 4, 
no. 1 (2002), 44.
76 Lippman, Fifty Years Later, 505.
77 Amann, Expressivism, 93.
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distinctions on a theoretical level obscures the fact that the question of which groups to protect 
is, essentially, a political one. Genocide instrumentalizes values and interests sustained by beliefs 
about the world. It is problematic when the values and interests allowed to permeate the Genocide 
Convention are in divergence with those expressed in the contemporary world. 
Notably, as times change, “reality” and discourses regarding what is worth protecting change 
too. It is understandable why groups defined by gender were not included at the drafting of 
the Convention. Post-World War II, the concepts of gender equality, gender discrimination, and 
gender per se were not widely regarded as interests worthy of protection within the international 
society. However, current discourses in international law are not equally lethargic towards gender 
issues. As stated previously, all major human rights treaties cover sex and/or gender. The current 
construction of the protected groups can therefore be said to be incompatible with the international 
human rights system. The important point to draw here is the inclusion of groups defined by 
gender in the international human rights system which underlines political ambition to combat 
gender-based discrimination. It is reasonable to assume that such political will to protect such 
groups from genocide also exists. There is thus a clash between the interest of combating gender-
based discrimination on a genocidal level and the interest of states to limit the erga omnes obligation 
of genocide. The solution to this clash between political impetus and the state reluctance, because 
of the erga omnes obligation, lies in the “expressivist” function of genocide. For the crime to retain 
its legitimacy, it must fit changing social and political trajectories. Thereby, it is necessary to 
calibrate the crime of genocide in relation to changing discourses, so they corroborate, inasmuch 
it is possible, to ensure the credibility of the judicial construct is preserved. There is reason to 
believe that the inclusion of groups defined by gender as protected under Article II could support 
such an undertaking. Against this background, we can now turn away from the more overarching 
questions and discuss the current state of affairs of the protected groups as it concerns groups 
defined by gender more concretely. 
The current construction of the protected groups provides support for the claim that the ICL 
system is substantively gendered. Fundamentally, the issue of gender-specific genocide often 
concerns women’s rights and women’s right to existence.78 The contemporary genocide discourse 
thus renders this “women’s issue” unworthy of protection. Thereby, it brushes aside the narratives 
of atrocities suffered by women. In that, it provides proof that the ICL system is gendered by 
being based on the realities of male lives.79 The groups worthy of protection in the Genocide 
Convention are gendered to suit atrocities that have befallen men. The ICL system, and the canon 
of protected groups in the Convention, is the creation of human beings, with its ultimate concern 
being individual behavior. It is thought of in terms of a neutral construction that is to be equitably 
applied, or as a rational institute, but it is not so. ICL is imbued by the choices between contesting 
values and policy interpretations. The absence of women in genocide law produces a narrow and 
insufficient jurisprudence that legitimizes the unequal position of, for instance, women worldwide 
rather than facing it. In consequence, the experiences of women are denied access to the continued 
shaping of ICL, its aims, and its content. If one believes such an order is politically and morally 
cumbersome, constructing groups defined by gender, as a protected group within the Genocide 
Convention, could serve as a first step in combating such structures. Resolving these issues should 
not be faced with overconfidence to the effects of policy changes. A legal construction which 
accounts for the experiences of women facing such atrocities does not automatically mean that 
marginalized groups defined by gender have gained access to the ICL system on a larger scale. 
Rather, a more acute perception would be which interests are allowed to permeate the types of 
people regarded as worthy of protection in a legal discourse. These problems go beyond how 
policies are phrased.
As touched upon previously, the current legal architecture of the protected groups in the 
Genocide Convention highlights the tension between formalism and instrumentalism within ICL. 
78 Mary Anne Warren, Gendercide: The Implications of Sex Selection (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1985), 22; Adam 
Jones, New Directions on Genocide Research (London: Routledge, 2012), 40.
79 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000).
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The schism is important in answering what the crime of genocide, and more broadly ICL, is for. In 
this regard, Martti Koskenniemi notes,
[f]rom the instrumental perspective, international law exists to realise objectives of some 
dominant part of the [international society]; from the formalist perspective, it provides a 
platform to evaluate behaviour, including the behaviour of those in dominant positions. The 
instrumental perspective highlights the role of law as social engineering; formalism views it 
as an interpretative scheme.80
The current order in the international society “is not one of pre-established harmony or struggle 
but of both cooperation and conflict simultaneously.”81 Thereby, “[a] form and a process is needed 
that channels interpretative conflicts into peaceful avenues.”82 There are substantial problems 
inherent in pragmatic instrumentalism. There is the extreme case of the “war against terrorism 
to canvas the slippery slope from anti-formal reasoning to human rights violation.”83 As such, it 
seems appropriate to opt for a prevailing view of legal formalism instead of an instrumental ditto.
The prevalent formalist conceptualization of the crime of genocide can thereby be understood 
as a form of protection from the imposition of objectives of some dominant part of the international 
society. However, a too formalist approach is a recipe for indifference and may risk making the 
judicial construction outdated. Formalism needs to be followed with a waking appreciation of 
its political underpinnings. There is, thus, reason to move beyond the dichotomy of formalism 
vis-à-vis instrumentalism to strike a balance between the different interests that ICL represent.84 
A starting point for such a quest could be to recognize ICL as a political project, acknowledging 
openly the battle for hegemony.85 Inherent is thereby the realization that there is no fixed set of 
objectives, purposes, or principles that can be unearthed externally from ICL in itself.86 Instead, 
these objectives cannot be anything than those of different legal actors with different hegemonic 
quests. ICL, and particularly the crime of genocide in international law, is an instrument; yet, as 
an instrument it cannot be considered in isolation, set apart from the political processes of which 
it is a complex part. That is why the objectives of ICL and its criminal constructions, moreover, is 
ICL in itself; and as a promise of “justice.” ICL and justice are connected in the conduct of legal 
actors, “paradigmatically in the legal judgment.”87 The judgment, however, is insufficient to bridge 
positive law and justice. Therefore, in the rift between ICL and justice lies the inevitable realm of 
politics law. It must be so, or else law becomes sheer positivity. That is why the question whether 
including groups defined by gender under the Genocide Convention is theoretically plausible 
should be addressed for what it is. It is not about objectives from diplomatic instruments, it is a 
question of political struggle. Hence, the true inquiry becomes, is it politically motivated to protect 
groups defined by gender from genocide?
Concluding Remarks
The Genocide Convention acknowledges some facets of collective life are constitutional for human 
identity to the extent freedom from physical and biological destruction is warranted to ensure their 
existence “as such.” At its core, ICL is a consent-based system. Its survival is dependent upon states 
accepting not only its jurisprudence, but also the moral and political ramifications thereof. The 
concept of a gender-specific genocide, and its interconnectivity with genocide, ostensibly emerge 
as problematic for international society as a whole and ICL in a systemic manner. The complexities 
80 Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 255.
81 Ibid., 249.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 249–250.
84 Mikael Baaz, “International Law is Different in Different Places: Russian Interpretations and Outlooks,” International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no, 1 (2016), 275.
85 Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 263.
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surfaced here are of a wholly political character. That is not inherently detrimental, but ICL should 
be responsive enough to handle contemporary challenges. If it does not, it runs the risk of throwing 
a shade of illegitimacy over the entire system. In the same way the criminal label “murder” cannot 
accurately communicate the atrocities of the Holocaust, it cannot accurately describe a gender-
specific genocide. This should not be interpreted that introducing a “new” crime of gender-specific 
genocide would be a panacea for such dilemmas. Even though a gender-specific genocide fits the 
theoretical underpinnings of international criminal regulation, these issues should not be tackled 
with over-confidence to the effects of policy changes. A construction that accounts for the reality 
of such conduct does not automatically render the issue of gender-specific genocides resolved. ICL 
is an insufficient system to cure all the woes in the world. Nor should it be expected to be able to 
do so. The law, and perhaps especially ICL, will always provide inadequate tools for dealing with 
genocide. Indeed, in the words of Arendt, “for these crimes, no punishment is severe enough. It 
may as well be essential to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast 
to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”88
Notwithstanding the imperfections of ICL, there is reason to do something rather than nothing. 
Apathy, too, takes its toll. The omission to protect groups defined by gender from genocide is a 
choice. This political choice is purchased at the cost of lost legitimacy of ICL. That, as it stands 
today, is a price it cannot afford to pay. Returning to the narrative in the introduction, legal 
terminology of inclusion and exclusion transforms and renders the victim group less worthy of 
protection than national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups. The attack on the group, the girls 
of the community, remains unseen. In the end, the omission to protect such groups from genocide 
represents a lacuna within ICL. If one believes this lacuna ought to be filled, an inclusion of groups 
defined by gender as protected in the Genocide Convention appears theoretically plausible. After 
all, to quote Lemkin, “if the destruction of human groups is a problem of international concern, 
then such acts should be treated as crimes under the law of nations.”89
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